EIDFED-004: Federation Trust Metadata Analysis
- Platform
- Entra ID / M365
- Category
- Entra ID Federation & Hybrid Identity
- Severity
- High
- Zero Trust pillar
- Identity (weight 2)
- Golden fixtures
- 2
- Branch coverage
- Observed: fixtures prove the verdicts they exercise
- Provenance
- baseline
What it checks
Federation trust metadata defines the identity provider endpoints, supported protocols, and token signing configuration used for federated authentication. Manipulated metadata can redirect authentication flows to attacker-controlled endpoints or introduce rogue signing certificates, enabling token forgery and impersonation attacks. The metadata endpoint URL, passive and active endpoints, and signing algorithm configurations should be validated against known-good values.
Recommended value
All federation trust metadata validated against known-good baseline with metadata refresh URLs pointing to organization-controlled endpoints
Remediation
Review the federation configuration for each federated domain including the metadata exchange URI, passive sign-on endpoint, issuer URI, and signing certificate details. Compare current values against a documented baseline configuration to identify any unauthorized modifications. Ensure metadata refresh endpoints use HTTPS and point to organization-controlled infrastructure, and validate that signing algorithms use SHA-256 or stronger.
Fixture-proven verdicts
Every verdict below is proven by a golden fixture in the module's gating test suite. This table derives from the last green run; it cannot be edited by hand.
| Scenario | Expected verdict |
|---|---|
| clean | PASS |
| throttled | Not Assessed |
Framework mappings
- NIST SP 800-53
- IA-8(4)
- MITRE ATT&CK
- T1556.006