EIDPIM-007: Privileged Users with Weak Authentication Methods
- Platform
- Entra ID / M365
- Category
- Entra ID Privileged Identity Management
- Severity
- High
- Zero Trust pillar
- Identity (weight 3)
- Golden fixtures
- 3
- Branch coverage
- Observed: fixtures prove the verdicts they exercise
- Provenance
- baseline
What it checks
Privileged accounts relying on weak authentication methods such as SMS, voice call, or email OTP are vulnerable to SIM-swapping, call interception, and email compromise attacks. These legacy MFA methods do not provide the same level of assurance as phishing-resistant methods like FIDO2 security keys, Windows Hello for Business, or certificate-based authentication. Privileged accounts should be required to use phishing-resistant authentication methods exclusively
Recommended value
All privileged users using phishing-resistant MFA methods (FIDO2, Windows Hello for Business, or certificate-based authentication). No SMS, voice, or email OTP
Remediation
Review authentication methods registered for each privileged user via Entra ID > Authentication methods > Activity. Create a Conditional Access policy targeting privileged roles that requires authentication strength of phishing-resistant MFA. Provision FIDO2 security keys or configure Windows Hello for Business for all privileged users and remove weak methods
Fixture-proven verdicts
Every verdict below is proven by a golden fixture in the module's gating test suite. This table derives from the last green run; it cannot be edited by hand.
| Scenario | Expected verdict |
|---|---|
| clean | PASS |
| known-bad | FAIL |
| throttled | Not Assessed |
Framework mappings
- CISA SCuBA
- MS.AAD.3.6v1
- NIST SP 800-53
- IA-2(1)
- MITRE ATT&CK
- T1111, T1078