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ADPWD-014: Contraseñas predeterminadas o comunes

Plataforma
Active Directory
Categoría
AD Password & Lockout Policies
Severidad
High
Pilar de Zero Trust
Identity (peso 2)
Fixtures de referencia
3
Cobertura de ramas
Observada: los fixtures prueban los veredictos que ejercitan
Procedencia
baseline

Qué comprueba

Las cuentas que usan contraseñas predeterminadas, comunes o triviales de adivinar (como Password1, Welcome1 o el propio nombre de cuenta) son los primeros objetivos en los ataques de rociado de contraseñas. Estas contraseñas están incluidas en todas las listas de palabras de los atacantes y a menudo se prueban en primer lugar

Por qué importa

A common password on any single account collapses the cost of intrusion to one HTTP POST or one Kerberos AS-REQ. The attacker does not need a 0-day, a phishing infrastructure, or a malware payload: the credential is already valid. Three concrete blast radii compound. First, foothold: a single common password on a low-privilege user is sufficient to authenticate to the internal network (VPN, Citrix, Azure AD / Entra ID sign-in, OWA, RDP gateway), enumerate the domain with PowerView or BloodHound, and begin lateral movement. Second, privilege escalation by graph: BloodHound shortest-path analysis routinely turns a single common-password user into Domain Admin in fewer than five edges because the compromised principal almost always has indirect rights (group memberships, GPO link permissions, computer object delegations) that the defender did not realize were exploitable. Third, persistence and re-entry: cracked NT hashes from NTDS dumps that match common-password patterns are reused across cloud SaaS, VPN, and the same users personal accounts for follow-on phishing, which means a weak password keeps working long after the incident-response team has rotated the obvious credentials. Microsoft Defender for Identity, Mandiant M-Trends, the Verizon DBIR, and CISA advisories all consistently list weak or default credentials as a top-five initial-access vector. The 2024 Snowflake incident, the 2023 23andMe credential-stuffing breach, and the long tail of Citrix / VPN compromises every quarter all trace back to the same primitive: one user, one common password, one valid authentication.

Ruta de ataque

Step 1: Username enumeration. The attacker scrapes UserPrincipalName values from OWA, Autodiscover, Teams presence, or Azure AD / Entra ID, and supplements with sAMAccountName generation from the public company directory. A typical mid-size enterprise yields 2,000 to 20,000 candidate usernames. Step 2: Wordlist preparation. The attacker assembles a candidate password list from SecLists (10-million-password-list-top-100 or top-1000), seasonal patterns (Spring2026!, Summer2026!), the company name with common decorators (Contoso1!, Contoso2026), and the NetBIOS domain name. Many attackers use the same default Test-PasswordQuality wordlist that defenders ship with. Step 3: Low-and-slow spray. The attacker runs kerbrute passwordspray, MSOLSpray, or DomainPasswordSpray against Kerberos pre-auth, Azure AD / Entra ID sign-in, OWA, or LDAP simple bind. With one password per user per observation window the spray stays under the default lockoutThreshold even if account lockout is configured. First-pass hit rates of 1 to 5 percent are typical against environments that have never run a common-password audit. Step 4: Triage hits for value. The attacker pipes every valid credential through BloodHound to compute shortest-path-to-Domain-Admin. Service accounts with SPNs become Kerberoasting targets (ADKERB-001), accounts with PASSWD_NOTREQD or DONT_EXPIRE_PASSWORD become long-term beacons, and any hit on an account in Tier 0 ends the engagement. Step 5: NTDS extraction and offline confirmation. Once Domain Admin is reached, the attacker pulls NTDS.dit via DCSync (Impacket secretsdump.py, Mimikatz lsadump::dcsync) and runs hashcat -m 1000 against the same common-password wordlists. Every account whose NT hash matches the wordlist is enumerated and the cleartext is captured for cross-platform reuse. Step 6: Credential reuse. The attacker tries the cracked cleartexts against the corporate VPN, Microsoft 365, GitHub Enterprise, AWS IAM, the same users personal Gmail (for phishing pivot), and any SaaS that does not enforce SSO. The Have I Been Pwned dataset shows that approximately 60 to 70 percent of users reuse passwords across at least one boundary, which is why a single common-password hit in AD typically leaks into adjacent identity planes.

Cómo lo evalúa Guerrilla

Guerrilla wraps DSInternals Test-PasswordQuality and feeds it a hash table extracted by Get-ADReplAccount (online, using MS-DRSR Get-NCChanges replication semantics) or Get-ADDBAccount (offline, against a forensic copy of NTDS.dit + SYSTEM hive). The candidate wordlist is the union of: SecLists Common-Credentials/10-million-password-list-top-1000.txt, a per-domain generated list (NetBIOS name, DNS short name, company name from msExchOrganizationName or the operator-provided -CompanyName parameter, current + previous year, season + year combinations, common keyboard walks Qwerty123!, Asdf1234!), and an optional operator-supplied custom wordlist. For each candidate the NT hash is computed as MD4(UTF-16-LE(password)) and compared against the unicodePwd-derived hash material for every enabled account where userAccountControl does not have ACCOUNTDISABLE set. The match is hash-equality, not online authentication, so the check generates zero Event 4625 (failed logon) noise and cannot trip account lockout. Findings are emitted with sAMAccountName, distinguishedName, the match category, pwdLastSet, adminCount, and a flag for membership in any privileged group resolved via tokenGroups expansion. The check additionally surfaces the DSInternals -WeakPassword and -DuplicatePasswordGroups buckets so the operator can see hash-collision clusters (multiple accounts sharing the same NT hash, a common pattern for break-glass and provisioning templates).

Valor recomendado

Ninguna cuenta que use contraseñas de las 1000 más comunes o que coincidan con patrones de contraseñas predeterminadas

Remediación

Pruebe los hashes de contraseñas contra listas de contraseñas comunes (como SecLists) utilizando DSInternals Test-PasswordQuality. Fuerce cambios de contraseña inmediatos en todas las cuentas con contraseñas comunes. Implemente Azure AD Password Protection, que incluye una lista global de contraseñas prohibidas actualizada por Microsoft

Veredictos probados con fixtures

Cada veredicto de esta tabla está probado por un fixture de referencia en la suite de pruebas que valida el módulo. La tabla se deriva de la última ejecución en verde; no puede editarse a mano.

Escenarios de veredicto de ADPWD-014
EscenarioVeredicto esperado
cleanPASS
known-badFAIL
no-dataNot Assessed

Mapeos a marcos de referencia

NIST SP 800-53
IA-5(1)
ANSSI
R34
CIS AD Benchmark
5.5.5
MITRE ATT&CK
T1110.001, T1110.003, T1078.002